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Abstract
The margin of victory is easy to compute for many election schemes but difficult for Instant Runoff
Voting (IRV). This is important because arguments about the correctness of an election outcome usually
rely on the size of the electoral margin. For example, risk-limiting audits require a knowledge of the
margin of victory in order to determine how much auditing is necessary. This paper presents a practi-
cal branch-and-bound algorithm for exact IRV margin computation that substantially improves on the
current best-known approach. Although exponential in the worst case, our algorithm runs efficiently in
practice on all the real examples we could find. We can efficiently discover exact margins on election
instances that cannot be solved by the current state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is system of preferential voting in which voters rank candidates in order of
preference. IRV is used for all parliamentary lower house elections in Australia, parliamentary elections in
Fiji and Papua New Guinea, presidential elections in Ireland and Bosnia/Herzogovinia, and local elections
in numerous locations world-wide, including the UK and United States [Richie, 2004]. Given a field of
candidates A, B, C, D, the ranking [A,B,C], in an IRV election, expresses a first preference for candidate
A, a second preference for B, and a third for C. Ballots are distributed to their first ranked candidate,
and redistributed to subsequent preferences during one or more rounds of candidate elimination. IRV has
many advantages over first-past-the-post – in which ballots are cast for a single candidate, and the candidate
with the most votes declared the winner. For example, it reduces the “spoiler” effect by allowing voters to
express a first preference for a candidate unlikely to gather much support, followed by a later preference for
a candidate more likely to win. Although there are still opportunities for strategic (i.e. dishonest) voting,
these are less prevalent than they are for first-past-the-post.
It is difficult, however, to compute either the true runner-up of an IRV election, or the margin by which
they lost. Consequently, it is difficult to establish whether a small problem in an election could have made
a difference to the outcome. Disputing an election outcome, or proving that it is correct, generally requires
some argument comparing the electoral margin to the precision of the process. For example, risk-limiting
audits [Lindeman and Stark, 2012] require knowledge of the victory margin to determine how much auditing
is required. A close election, in which the margin of victory is small, requires more auditing than one with
a large margin.
Automatic recounting of ballots, for example, is triggered in many jurisdictions if the last round margin
(the difference between the tallies of the last two remaining candidates, divided by two and rounded up)
of an IRV election falls below a threshold. The 2013 Federal Election for the Australian seat of Fairfax,
in Queensland, for example, had a last round margin of just 4 votes, triggering a recount [AP, 2013]. The
actual margin of victory for an IRV election, however, may be much lower than its last round margin. The
2011 federal election for the Australian seat of Balmain, New South Wales, had a last round margin of 1239
votes, with 2477 votes separating the last two remaining candidates – a Liberal and a Green [NSWEC, 2011].
The actual margin of victory, however, was at most 388 votes, with 775 votes separating the Greens and
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Labor in a prior round of elimination. Last round margins will therefore trigger recounts in only a portion
of eligible IRV elections.
This paper contributes a practical algorithm for exact IRV margin computation that substantially im-
proves on the current best-known approach by Magrino et al. [2011]. On 25 IRV elections held in the United
States between 2007 and 2010, Magrino et al. [2011] compute margins in several hundred seconds in 24 of the
25 instances, and fail to compute a margin within 12 hours in the remainder. Although exponential in the
worst case, our algorithm runs efficiently in practice on all real election instances for which we could obtain
data. On all 25 IRV elections examined by Magrino et al. [2011], our algorithm computes exact margins in
less than 2 seconds.
An obvious, but inefficient, algorithm for computing exact IRV margins is to consider every possible
order in which candidates could have been eliminated, and use a linear program (LP) solver such as CPLEX
to compute the exact number of manipulations (ballot modifications, additions, and deletions) necessary to
achieve it. Magrino et al. [2011] improve upon this with clever ways to identify which elimination orders
are not worth investigating. Our algorithm follows the same basic structure but introduces a new, easily
computed, lower bound on the number of ballot manipulations required to realise any given elimination
order, allowing us to eliminate whole classes of possible orders very quickly. This significantly improves
upon the time required to compute exact margins of victory.
Magrino et al. [2011] compute margins under the assumption that any manipulation applied to the set
of ballots cast in an election must leave the number of ballots unchanged. We present several variations of
our algorithm in which this assumption is not required. This allows us to answer a number of important
questions, including the potential influence of lost ballots (could their inclusion have altered the election
outcome?) and informal ballots (incorrectly filled out ballots excluded from the count). One question of
interest is “how many ballots must be added to the election profile to realise a different outcome?”. If this
number of ballots is less than the number of lost or spoiled ballots, we can say that these ballots have the
potential to change the election outcome. In the 2013 Australian federal election (lower house), the number
of informal votes totalled 5.91% of all ballots cast – the highest rate experienced since 1984 [SBS, 2014].
A separate, but equally important, question is “how many ballots, of those cast, must we remove to
change the election outcome?”. This question is of particular relevance in jurisdictions that suffer from
multiple voting. In Australian state and federal elections, each polling station has a book containing the
names and addresses of all electors in the region. As each elector casts their vote, their name is struck off
by hand. This does not prevent an elector, however, from casting multiple votes in multiple polling booths.
In the 2013 Australian federal election, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) ‘investigated almost
19,000 instances of multiple voting’ [ABC, 2014]. In this situation we know that there are a certain number
of invalid ballots, but not which ballots are invalid. If this total exceeds the number of ballots that, if
removed, change the result of the election, we know we have a problem.
The answer to the two questions described above can be obtained by calculating the electoral victory
margin under the assumption that ballots can only be added to the election (addition only) or removed
(deletion only), respectively. We consider both settings in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We describe existing approaches designed to compute
bounds on, and exact values for, the margin of victory in IRV elections in Section 2. The manner in which
counting proceeds in IRV elections, and a formal definition of the margin of victory, is presented in Section
3. Sections 4 and 5 describe and evaluate our algorithm for the exact computation of IRV margins. Section
6 examines two variations of our algorithm in which ballots may be deleted from or added to an election
profile, but not both. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of expected future work.
2 Related Work
Exact computation of IRV electoral margins is NP-hard. Bartholdi III and Orlin [1991] have demonstrated
that it is NP-hard to compute a preference ordering on a set of candidates C that, when combined with the
preferences of a set of voters V , results in the election of a specific candidate c ∈ C. However, this result
is defined in terms of the number of candidates, not the number of votes, so this may not imply that the
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problem is hard in practice when the number of candidates is small. Related NP-hardness results have been
presented by Conitzer et al. [2003] and Conitzer et al. [2007].
These results refer to the worst case complexity of manipulating a voting scheme. Procaccia and Rosenchein
[2007] demonstrate that given certain assumptions regarding the distribution of votes in an election, it is
possible to find voting rules that are average-case hard to manipulate. Conitzer and Sandholm [2006] high-
light that efficient algorithms can be designed to successfully compute such manipulations in many real
instances, proving that it is impossible to design a voting rule for which computing a manipulation is “usu-
ally hard”. Friedgut et al. [2008] and Isaksson et al. [2012] have shown that for a very general class of voting
schemes, a random manipulation by a random voter will succeed in altering the outcome of an election with
a non-negligible probability. This result is a quantitative expression of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
[Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975]. Gibbard [1973] demonstrates that any non-dictatorial voting scheme,
involving at least three candidates, can be manipulated by an individual voter. Satterthwaite [1975] proves
that any strategy-proof voting scheme (a scheme that cannot be manipulated by a voter misrepresenting their
preferences to achieve a desired outcome) is dictatorial, meaning that a single entity holds absolute power in
determining the outcome. While, in the worst case, the complexity of finding a strategic manipulation of an
IRV election to achieve a desired outcome is NP-hard, it is possible, with some probability, to achieve such
a manipulation via random selection.
Many authors have developed algorithms for the computation of victory margins in IRV elections that
can be efficiently applied in most real instances. Cary [2011] defines several upper and lower bounds on
the true IRV margin of victory, including one called the “Winner Elimination Upper Bound” which simply
finds the most efficient way to eliminate the apparent winner at each elimination round, and returns the
least-cost (involving the smallest number of vote changes) of these. Sarwate et al. [2013] provide bounds
on the margin of victory for IRV and various other complex voting schemes. Sarwate et al. [2013] compute
lower bounds on the margin of victory in IRV elections by picking sets of candidates to eliminate in order
to maximise the difference between the number of votes allocated to the candidates in these sets, and to the
remaining candidate with the fewest votes. The bounds defined by Cary [2011] and Sarwate et al. [2013]
can be computed in polynomial time, but are not necessarily tight (i.e. these bounds may differ significantly
from the true margin).
Sarwate et al. [2013] compare their computed bounds to exact margins for a set of IRV elections conducted
in the United States, and three Irish elections. In the 31 elections in which exact margins were known,
computed lower bounds equalled exact margins in 18 elections, and fell below exact margins by a number of
votes equaling 0.6 to 19% of the total votes cast in the remainder. Computed upper bounds were typically
within a few votes of exact margins, with a number of exceptions. For the 2009 Aspen City Council election,
which forms part of the data set considered in this paper, the lower and upper bound of Sarwate et al.
[2013] differ from the exact margin by 2.5% (62 votes) and 9.9% (254 votes) of the total number of votes,
respectively. The algorithm we present in this paper for the exact computation of IRV margins finds the
exact margin of victory in this election within 1.5 seconds. In the 2008 race for Pierce County assessor, their
lower and upper bound differ from the exact margin by 0.6% (1945 votes) and 1.6% (5079 votes) of the total
number of votes, respectively. Our algorithm computes the exact margin in this race within 0.02 seconds.
Magrino et al. [2011] present a branch-and-bound algorithm (MRSW) to compute the exact margin
of victory in IRV elections. Applied to 25 IRV elections in the United States, their approach successfully
computes exact margins in all but one instance. Magrino et al. [2011] consider the space of possible alternate
elimination orders of a set of candidates C, in which the actual winner cw ∈ C is not the last remaining
candidate. Given one such order, a linear program (LP) is presented which computes the smallest number
of votes (of those cast in the election) that must be modified in order to realise this elimination order. When
applied to a partial sequence of candidates, L, the LP computes the smallest number of ballot changes
required to achieve this order of elimination in a reduced election profile, in which all candidates not in L
have been eliminated (and their votes redistributed). It is clear that this bound is also a lower bound on the
number of ballot changes required to achieve any elimination order (involving all candidates) ending in L.
Magrino et al. [2011] first construct a priority queue, initially containing one node for each candidate in
C \ cw. The lower bound assigned to each of these nodes is (necessarily) 0. In the reduced election profiles
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Table 1: An IRV election between four candidates
Ballot Ranking Count
[A, C, B, D] 40
[B, C, A, D] 21
[C, A, B, D] 10
[C, A, D] 10
[D, B, C, A] 5
(a) Ballot rankings and counts
Candidate Initial Tally Round 2 Round 3
A 40 40 60
B 21 26 26
C 20 20 —
D 5 — —
(b) Tallies in each round of vote counting
computed for each node, only one candidate remains, and thus no votes need be changed to ensure their
election. Each node in the queue is expanded to add several new partial elimination orders to the search tree
– the expansion of [ci], for example, adds a node [cj , ci] to the queue, for all cj ∈ C \ ci. Each of these new
nodes is assigned a lower bound, computed by the provided LP. Nodes with the smallest lower bounds are
prioritised for expansion. The smallest LP evaluation obtained for each visited leaf node (orders containing
all candidates) provides an upper bound on the smallest manipulation required to alter the election result.
Nodes are pruned from the tree (none of their descendants are explored) if their lower bound is larger than
this upper bound.
The main restricting cost of MRSW is the number of nodes that are explored and evaluated via the
LP. The algorithm we present in this paper dramatically reduces the number of partial elimination orders
explored in the computation of exact margins, relative to MRSW, through the use of a scoring rule assigning
tighter lower bounds to nodes close to the root of the search tree. We are consequently able to prune larger
portions of the search space.
3 Counting Votes in an IRV Election
Consider the example election of Table 1, between four candidates A, B, C, and D, taken from Magrino et al.
[2011]. Each ballot (vote) is a list of candidates, ranked in preference order. For example, ballot [A,B,C]
denotes that the voter likes candidate A best, then B, and then C. The ranking [A,B,C] is alternately
known as the signature of the ballot. Voters may express partial preferences, such as [A] which simply votes
for candidate A, or [A,B] which prefers A to B and no more. Table 1a lists the candidate rankings present
across the set of ballots cast in this election, alongside the number of ballots in which each of these rankings
appear. For example, 40 voters cast ballots with the ranking [A, C, B, D], and 5 with [D, B, C, A].
The tallying of votes in an IRV election proceeds by a series of rounds in which the candidate with the
lowest tally is eliminated — see Figure 1 — with the last remaining candidate declared the winner. For each
candidate c, we first compute the number of ballots in which c is ranked first. Table 1b reports the total
number of first preference ballots in each candidates’ tally (their Initial Tally). Candidate A has the most
first preference votes at 40. Candidate D has the fewest at 5, and is eliminated in the first round. The 5
votes in D’s tally are redistributed to B, who has 26 ballots in their tally after the second round of counting.
Continuing in this fashion, candidate C is next eliminated. All of the ballots in C’s tally have A as the next
preferred candidate, and are thus redistributed to A. In the third round of counting, A has 60 votes while
B has 26. The elimination of candidate B results in the election of A. In practice, the total number of votes
reduces as the tallying algorithm progresses, as some voters express only a partial list of preferences. When
the last ranked candidate in a ballot is eliminated, this ballot is deemed exhausted.
It is tempting to think that the difference in the tallies of the two last remaining candidates in an IRV
election is the true number of votes by which the winner won. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Consider for example the (very close) election for the seat of Balmain in the Australian state of New South
Wales in 2011 [NSWEC, 2011]. This was a genuine three-way race between the Labor Party, the Liberal
Party and the Greens. The last two rounds of elimination are shown in Table 2. In the final round, the
Greens won comfortably over the Liberal Party. However, in a prior round they only very narrowly defeated
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Initially, all candidates remain standing (are not eliminated)
While there is more than one candidate standing
For every candidate c standing
Tally (count) the votes in which c is the highest-ranked candidate of those standing
Eliminate the candidate with the smallest tally
The winner is the one candidate not eliminated
Figure 1: An informal definition of the IRV counting algorithm.
the Labor Party, from which almost all votes then passed their next preferences to the Greens. The large
margin in the last round does not reflect the true difference between winner and losers, which was actually
determined by the (very small) difference between Labor and the Greens in a prior elimination round.
We define the margin of victory of an election as the smallest number of ballots that if modified, by some
adversary, will result in the election of a different candidate [Magrino et al., 2011]. If several candidates
receive the same number of votes, at any stage of the IRV count, we assume that the adversary can decide
which of the candidates is eliminated. This assumption is made by Magrino et al. [2011]. If an adversary
cannot determine which of these tied candidates is eliminated, the margin of victory of Definition 2 slightly
underestimates (but never overestimates) the margin of victory of the election. We define the last round
margin of an election in Definition 1.
Definition 1 Last Round Margin The last round margin of an election, B, in which two candidates
ci, cj ∈ C remain with t{ci,cj}(ci) and t{ci,cj}(cj) ballots in their tally, is equal to half the difference between
the tallies of the two remaining candidates rounded up.
LRMB = ⌈
|t{ci,cj}(ci)− t{ci,cj}(cj)|
2
⌉ (1)
Definition 2 Margin of Victory The true margin of victory in an election between candidates c1, c2,
. . . ,cn ∈ C, with winner cw ∈ C, is the smallest number of ballots whose ranking must be modified so that a
different candidate cj ∈ C \ cw becomes the winner of the election.
In the election of Table 1, the last round margin, by Definition 1, is 17 votes, while the true margin
of victory, by Definition 2, is only 3 votes. Let us consider an alternative election profile to that shown in
Table 1a, in which 3 of the 5 votes with ranking [D, B, C, A] are changed to [D, C]. After candidate D is
eliminated, 2 votes are distributed to candidate B, and 3 to C. Candidates B and C have equal tallies of
23 votes. If our adversary decides to eliminate candidate B, the tallies of candidates A and C in the third
round of counting are now 40 and 46, respectively. All of B’s 23 votes were distributed to candidate C.
4 Fast Margin Computation via Branch-and-Bound
We present a branch-and-bound algorithm for the computation of victory margins in IRV elections. This
algorithm has the same basic structure as that of Magrino et al. [2011], being a traversal of the tree of
possible orders of candidate elimination. Our algorithm incorporates a substantially improved pruning rule,
however, allowing us to dramatically reduce the portion of this tree we must traverse to determine the exact
victory margin. In this section, we describe our algorithm in detail and contrast its performance against
the current state-of-the-art approach of Magrino et al. [2011] on 29 IRV elections held in the United States
between 2007 and 2014.
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Table 2: Preference distributions for Balmain, New South Wales, Australia, 2011.
Party First preference tallies First elimination round Final winner
Labor 13,809 Eliminated -
Green 14,584 19,141 Elected
Liberal 15,293 16,664 Eliminated
4.1 Preliminaries
Let C be the set of candidates in an election B. We refer to sequences of candidates pi in list notation, e.g.
pi = [A,C,D,B], and use such sequences to represent both ballots and elimination orders. We will often
treat a sequence as the set of elements it contains. An election B is defined as a multiset1 of ballots, each
ballot b ∈ B a sequence of candidates in C, with no duplicates, listed in order of preference (most preferred
to least preferred). Let first(pi) denote the first candidate appearing in sequence pi. At any stage in the
counting of an IRV election, there are a current set of eliminated candidates E and a current set of candidates
still standing S = C \ E . The winner cw of the election is the last standing candidate.
Definition 3 Projection pS(pi) We define the projection of a sequence pi onto a set S as the largest
subsequence of pi that contains only elements of S. (The elements keep their relative order in pi). For
example:
p{B,C}([A,B,D,C]) = [B,C] and p{B,C,D,E}([F,D,G,B,A]) = [D,B].
Throughout the counting process, each candidate c ∈ C has a tally of ballots. Ballots can be added to
this tally upon the elimination of a candidate c′ ∈ C \ c, and are redistributed from this tally upon the
elimination of c. We formally define a candidate’s tally as follows.
Definition 4 Tally tS(c) Given candidates S ⊆ C are still standing in an election B, the tally for a
candidate c ∈ C is denoted tS(c), and is defined as the number of ballots b ∈ B for which c is the most-
preferred candidate of those remaining. Recall that each ballot b ∈ B is a sequence of candidates, and pS(b)
the sequence of candidates mentioned in b that are also in S.
tS(c) = |[b | b ∈ B, c = first(pS(b))]| (2)
Using the notation presented in this section, we can formalise the IRV counting algorithm of Figure 1 as
shown in Figure 2.
4.2 The MRSW Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
In order to obtain a new result (a new winner) in an election B we must modify the ballots of the election
to give a new elimination order (i.e. where the winning candidate is not the last candidate standing).
The MRSW algorithm [Magrino et al., 2011] investigates, without traversing all of, the tree of all possible
elimination orders. The goal of the algorithm presented by Magrino et al. [2011] is to find the alternate
elimination order requiring the smallest number of ballots in B to be modified. A modification of a ballot
b ∈ B is defined as a replacing the sequence of candidates appearing in b with a new sequence (not necessarily
involving the same set of candidates). The number of ballot changes required to realise this elimination order
is, by Definition 2, the margin of victory. Several such orders may exist for an election, where each requires
the least number of ballot changes. We call each such order a least change alternate elimination order.
1A multiset allows for the inclusion of duplicate items.
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S := C
E := ∅
while |S| > 1
e = argminc∈S tS(c) e is the candidate with the smallest tally
E = E ∪ {e} e is the next candidate to be eliminated
S = S \ {e}
return S
Figure 2: A formal definition of the IRV counting algorithm.
Each node in the tree constructed by Magrino et al. [2011] represents a (partial) elimination order pi,
where pi ⊆ C. Each node pi has children constructed by adding a candidate in C \ pi to the front of the
elimination order. The root of the tree, labelled with the empty sequence [], has children labelled [c] for
each c ∈ C \ {cw}, where cw is the winner of B. A node [cw] is not added to this tree, as we do not need to
consider elimination orders which do not change the result of the election. We can think of each node in the
tree as representing a reduced election Bpi = [ppi(b)|b ∈ B] of only the candidates in pi. All candidates not in
pi have been removed from their positions in each ballot b ∈ B. The sequence pi denotes an elimination order
for the candidates in this reduced election. Each descendant of node [c] represents an elimination order in
which c ∈ C is the winner in its associated reduced election. The leaves of this tree are each a sequence
containing all candidates in C, and represent an alternate elimination order for B.
Figure 3a shows the tree constructed for the election of Table 1, after a child [c] for each c ∈ C \ {cw}
has been added to the root []. This tree is traversed by adding children to the node which we expect will
lead to a least change alternate elimination order. In the MRSW algorithm, each node pi is assigned a score
using a linear program (LP), denoted DistanceTo(pi, C, B). This LP, presented in Appendix A, computes
the smallest number of ballots in B that must be modified to realise the elimination order pi in the reduced
election Bpi. Magrino et al. [2011] show that this number is a lower bound on the number of ballots in the
(non-reduced) election B that must be changed to realise an elimination order than ends in the sequence
pi. Magrino et al. [2011] add children to (expand) nodes which have the lowest assigned score. The score
computed by DistanceTo(pi, C, B) for a leaf node pi represents exactly the number of ballots in B that
must be modified to realise the elimination order pi. The smallest score assigned to any leaf node visited
while traversing the tree of elimination orders defines an upper bound (U) on the smallest number of ballot
changes required to alter the result of the election. Any subsequently visited node with a score equal to or
greater than U can be pruned from the tree, as it is clear it will not lead to an order requiring fewer than U
ballot changes to realise.
Figure 4 formally defines the branch-and-bound algorithm of Magrino et al. [2011], denoted MRSW. A
fringe of nodes Q is maintained to represent the evolving search tree. Initially, Q is empty (Step 1) and the
upper bound on the number of ballot changes required to change the election result is set to the last round
margin of the election, as per Definition 1 (Step 2). A node for each candidate in C \ {cw}, where cw is the
winner of the election, is scored and added to the fringe in Steps 3–6. The elimination order pi in Q with the
lowest score is expanded and its children (each child is created by adding a candidate c ∈ C, c 6∈ pi, to the
front of pi) are added to Q if their score is less than the current upper bound U (Step 11 and Steps 16–20).
The children that are not added to Q have been pruned from the tree. If a child represents a complete
elimination order (an order containing all candidates), this child is a leaf node. If the score l of this leaf is
less than U , the upper bound is set to l (Step 14). The algorithm terminates when no nodes remain in Q
– all possible nodes in the search tree have been visited and scored, or pruned – returning U (Step 12). At
the conclusion of the algorithm, U is equal to the smallest score assigned to any visited leaf node. It thus
represents the smallest number of ballot changes required to alter the result of election B.
Figure 3b shows the tree constructed for the election of Table 1, after node [B] has been expanded (Step
11). In Step 2, U was set to the last round margin for this election, which is 17. Nodes [A,B] and [C,B],
each with a score of 17, are pruned from the tree.
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[]
[B] [C] [D]
0 0 0
(a)
[]
[B] [C] [D]
0 0 0
[C,B] [D,B] [A,B]
17 0 17
(b)
Figure 3: Example tree of elimination orders at (a) depth one and (b) after the expansion of [B].
4.3 An Improved Scoring Function
Let us consider a partial elimination order pi ⊆ C. Each candidate e ∈ C \ pi must be eliminated before every
candidate c ∈ pi. We define ∆(c, e) as the number of ballots b ∈ B for which c is ranked higher than e, or c
appears and e does not. This is equal to the number of ballots with rankings [c, e] or [c] when all candidates
apart from c and e are removed. At any time e is eliminated before c, c has a tally of at most ∆(c, e) at the
moment e is eliminated, with all other ballots assigned to e, or another candidate. Recall that pS(b) denotes
the projection of b onto set S (ie. the ranking of ballot b with all candidates not in the set S removed).
∆(c, e) = | [ b | b ∈ B, p{c,e}(b) ∈ {[c, e], [c]} ] | (3)
We define the primary vote of a candidate c ∈ C, denoted f(c), as the number of ballots b ∈ B for which
c is the highest ranked candidate.
f(c) = | [ b | b ∈ B, c = first(b) ] | (4)
To ensure that candidate e is eliminated before candidate c, we require that f(e) ≤ ∆(c, e). In other
words, we require that the primary vote of e is less than or equal to the number of ballots in which c is
ranked higher than e, or c appears and e does not. If it is the case that f(e) > ∆(c, e), we need to change the
relative counts by the amount f(e)−∆(c, e) for this order of elimination to be feasible. Let l1(c, e) denote
a lower bound on the number of ballots that must be modified to achieve the elimination of e before c.
l1(c, e) = ⌈
f(e)−∆(c, e)
2
⌉ (5)
Since each candidate e ∈ C\pi has been eliminated prior to every candidate c ∈ pi, we can compute a lower
bound on the number of ballots in B that must be modified in order to realise an elimination order ending
in pi, lb1(pi), as shown in Equation 6. This lower bound does not consider the order in which candidates
are eliminated in pi, but calculates the number of ballots we must alter to get to a situation in which the
candidates in pi are the last candidates standing.
lb1(pi) = max{l1(c
′, e′) | c′ ∈ pi, e′ ∈ C \ pi} (6)
We can improve this reasoning further. Consider the partial elimination order pi, for which all candidates
e ∈ C \ pi are eliminated before any c ∈ pi. We know that e has at least f(e) ballots in its tally. Candidate
c may not have, in their tally, all ballots which have been counted toward ∆(c, e) (those in which c appears
before e, or c appears, but e does not). Some of these ballots may lie in the tallies of other candidates in pi,
who have not yet been eliminated. We define ∆S(c, e) as the maximum number of ballots that c can have
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MRSW(C, B, cw)
1 Q := ∅
2 U := LRMB Upper bound is set to the last round margin
3 for(c ∈ C \ {cw})
4 pi := [c]
5 l := 0 DistanceTo(pi, C, B) = 0
6 Q := Q ∪ {(l, pi)}
7 while Q 6= ∅
8 (l, pi) := argminQ Find node with the lowest score (l)
9 Q := Q \ {(l, pi)} Expand node by scoring and adding children
10 if (l < U)
11 U := expandM(l, pi, U,Q, C,B) Update upper bound if a leaf is found
12 return U
expandM(l, pi, U,Q, C,B)
13 if(|pi| = |C|) pi contains all candidates (is a leaf node)
14 return l l = DistanceTo(pi, C, B) and l < U
15 else
16 for(c ∈ C \ pi)
17 pi′ := [c] ++ pi Add c to the front of pi
18 l′ := DistanceTo(pi′, C, B)
19 if(l′ < U)
20 Q := Q ∪ {(l′, pi′)} Add child to the tree
21 return U
Figure 4: The MRSW algorithm applied to an election B, with candidates C, and winner cw.
in their tally at the moment e is eliminated, where S = {e} ∪ pi denotes the minimal set of candidates that
must be ‘still standing’ at this time.
∆S(c, e) = | [ b | b ∈ B, c = first(pS(b) ] | (7)
To realise a situation in which candidate e ∈ C \ pi is eliminated prior to candidate c ∈ pi, we require that
f(e) ≤ ∆S(c, e), and hence if f(e) > ∆S(c, e) then we must modify at least l2(c, e, pi) ballots.
l2(c, e, pi) = ⌈
f(e)−∆S(c, e)
2
⌉ (8)
A tighter lower bound on the number of ballots in B that must be changed to realise the situation where
pi ⊆ C are the last remaining candidates, lb2(pi), is shown in Equation 9. Note that l2(c, e, pi) ≤ l1(c, e), for
all pi ⊆ C, c ∈ pi, and e ∈ C \ pi. Hence, lb2(pi) ≥ lb1(pi) for all pi ⊆ C.
lb2(pi) = max{l2(c, e, pi) | c ∈ pi, e ∈ C \ pi} (9)
This lower bound is independent of the order of candidates in pi.
4.4 An Improved Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
We can modify the MRSW algorithm of Magrino et al. [2011] to use the new lower bound computed in
Equation 9 as shown in Figure 5. The principal advantage of this modified algorithm is that lb2(pi) takes
into account the candidates that must have been eliminated prior to those in pi, while DistanceTo(pi, C, B)
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margin(C, B, cw)
1 Q := ∅
2 U := LRMB Upper bound is set to the last round margin
3 for(c ∈ C \ {cw})
4 pi := [c]
5 l := lb2(pi) Compute score via Equation (9)
6 if(l < U) Add node to Q only if score is less than U
7 Q := Q ∪ {(l, pi)}
8 while Q 6= ∅
9 (l, pi) := argminQ Find node with the lowest score (l)
10 Q := Q \ {(l, pi)} Expand node by scoring and adding children
11 if (l < U)
12 U := expand(l, pi, U,Q, C,B) Update upper bound if a leaf is found
13 return U
expand(l, pi, U,Q, C,B)
14 if(|pi| = |C|) pi contains all candidates (is a leaf)
15 return DistanceTo(pi, C, B)
16 for(c ∈ C \ pi)
17 pi′ := [c] ++pi Add c to the front of pi
18 l′ = max{l, lb2(pi′)}
19 if(l′ < U) Solve LP only if score is not already too large
20 m = DistanceTo(pi′, C, B)
21 l′ := max{l′,m}
22 if(l′ < U) Prune node whose score is not less than U
23 Q := Q ∪ {(l′, pi′)}
24 return U
Figure 5: An improved algorithm for exact computation of margins.
considers only the candidates that are in pi, and their order of elimination. Our algorithm computes lb2(pi)
for each visited node pi, and prunes those that we know will not lead to a least change alternate order. We
add a node pi to the tree with a score equal to the maximum of lb2(pi) and DistanceTo(pi, C, B), but avoid
solving the DistanceTo LP if lb2(pi) is already too large for pi to be of interest.
Consider the example election of Table 1. Figure 6 highlights which elimination orders are considered
by the algorithm of Magrino et al. [2011] in its computation of the exact margin. Each node denotes an
elimination order that is traversed and evaluated by the MRSW algorithm, with its score recorded. For
example, the MRSW algorithm first considers the partial elimination orders [B], [C], and [D], assigning each
a score of 0. The upper bound on the degree of manipulation required to change the outcome of the election
is initially set to 17 ballots. The algorithm expands node [D], adding its children to the tree – [A,D] with a
score of 17, [B,D] with a score of 28, and [C,D] with a score of 38. All three of these nodes have a score that
is equal to or greater than 17, and are not considered further. Node [C] is expanded, creating children [A,C],
[B,C], and [D,C], each with a score of 0. In our implementation of MRSW, node [A,C] is expanded next,
creating child nodes [B,A,C], with a score of 3, and [D,A,C] with a score of 0. The leaf node [B,D,A,C]
is then visited and assigned a score of 8, setting the current upper bound to 8. Nodes [B,C] and [D,C] are
considered in turn, visiting 5 additional nodes. At this point, node [B,A,C] has the lowest score at 3. The
leaf [D,B,A,C] is visited and assigned a score of 3, setting the current upper bound to 3. No remaining
node has a score lower than 3, and the algorithm terminates. In total, MRSW visits 23 nodes and solves 20
LPs.
On this example election, our algorithm visits and evaluates the subset of shaded nodes in Figure 6,
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Figure 6: Traversal of elimination orders by both MRSW, and our algorithm (shaded).
reporting beside each node the score we assign to it. Nodes [B], [C], and [D], are assigned scores of 7, 0, and
8, respectively. This allows us to concentrate on elimination orders ending in C. Nodes [A,C], [B,C], and
[D,C], are assigned scores of 1, 10, and 18. Node [D,C] can be immediately pruned from the tree. Nodes
[B,A,C] and [D,A,C] are then considered, with scores of 1 and 8, respectively. The leaf node [D,B,A,C]
is considered, and given a score of 3. No nodes remain with scores lower than 3, and so our algorithm is
able to prune the remainder of the search space, and return a margin of 3. Our algorithm assigns scores to 9
nodes, but solves only 5 LPs in the process. The MRSW algorithm, in contrast, solves 20 LPs (not requiring
an LP solve for the immediate children of the root, nodes [B], [C], and [D]).
5 Computational Results
We have evaluated the branch-and-bound algorithm we present in Figure 5 on 29 IRV elections held in the
United States. Moreover, we contrast the performance of our approach on this data set with that of the
MRSW algorithm of Magrino et al. [2011]. Execution was performed on a machine with four 2.10 GHz CPUs,
7.7 GB of memory, and with a 12 hour timeout. CPLEX 12.5.1 was used to solve all LPs. Table 3 reports,
for each of the 29 IRV elections considered, the number of candidates and ballots cast in the election, the
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number of calls to the DistanceTo LP made by MRSW and by our improved branch-and-bound algorithm
(denoted margin), the computation time (in milliseconds) of the two algorithms, the margin of victory and
the last-round margin.
It is clear that our algorithm substantially reduces both the number of calls to DistanceTo and the
computation time. We are able to compute the margin of victory in the 2007 San Francisco Mayor instance,
where MRSW timed out after 12 hours. The results in Table 3 replicate those of Magrino et al. [2011] in
terms of margins calculated.2 In generating these results, our algorithm uses the tighter lb2 pruning rule of
Equation 9. We compare these results with those obtained when pruning with lb1 (Equation 6), in Table 6,
shown in Appendix B.
6 Variations
While our margin of victory calculations concentrate on the least number of ballot modifications required to
change the result of an election, sometimes we wish to ask a slightly different question.
6.1 Addition only
Suppose some ballots are lost during an election. The question of whether the lost ballots could change
the result of the election asks “what is the minimum number of ballots required to be added to change the
result of the election.” The extension of our margin algorithm (shown in Figure 5) to answer this question
is straightforward.
We first modify the last round margin calculation of Definition 1. In this setting, manipulations can only
add ballots. Hence, we define the last round margin (addition only) to be the difference in tallies of the last
two remaining candidates ci and cj (the margin is not divided by two):
LRM+B = |t{ci,cj}(ci)− t{ci,cj}(cj)|
Similarly, we redefine l1 of Equation (5) to compute a lower bound on the number of ballots that must be
added to ensure that candidate e is eliminated before c, l+1 (c, e), as follows:
l+1 (c, e) = f(e)−∆(c, e)
A lower bound on the number of ballots that must be added to the election to realise an elimination order
ending in pi is given by:
lb+1 (pi) = max{l
+
1 (c
′, e′) | c′ ∈ pi, e′ ∈ C \ pi}
Tighter lower bounds l+2 and lb
+
2 are similarly defined, given the definitions of l2 and lb2 in Equations (8) and
(9). We modify the DistanceTo LP of Magrino et al. [2011] to calculate the minimum number of ballot
additions required to enforce a certain elimination order, creating DistanceTo+. Details are discussed in
Appendix A.
We define margin+ as a variation of margin in which: LRM+B is used in place of LRMB; DistanceTo
+
in place of DistanceTo; and lb+2 in place of lb2. If an upper bound UL on the number of lost ballots is
known we can initialise U with min{UL + 1, LRM
+
B }, as we are not interested in manipulations requiring
the addition of more than UL ballots. If margin
+ returns UL + 1, the election result cannot be changed by
adding at most UL ballots.
Table 4 reports, for each of the IRV elections we consider in this paper, the number of calls to the Dis-
tanceTo
+ LP made by MRSW and margin+, the computation time (in milliseconds) of the two algorithms,
the margin of victory and the last-round margin (LRM+B ).
2Our reimplementation of the MRSW algorithm made slightly fewer LP calls than the original work, as reported by
Magrino et al. [2011]. This is likely due to small arbitrary decisions regarding the prioritisation of nodes given the same
score. Moreover, the total number of ballots cast, and the resulting margin, reported here for the Oakland 2014 Mayoral
election are slightly lower than reported by ACGOV [2014]. This is likely due to differences in the inclusion of under and
overvotes.
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Table 3: Running times and margins computed for 29 IRV elections in the United States, using MRSW and margin.
|C| |B| MRSW LPs margin LPs MRSW margin Margin Last-Round Margin Race
Time (ms) Time (ms) LRMB
2 45986 1 0 1 1 15356 15356 Berkeley 2010 Auditor
2 15243 1 0 1 1 4830 4830 Oakland 2010 D2 School Board
2 14040 1 0 1 1 4826 4826 Oakland 2010 D6 School Board
2 23494 1 0 1 1 8338 8338 San Leandro 2010 D3 City Council
3 122268 6 1 1 1 17081 17081 Oakland 2010 Auditor
3 15243 6 1 1 1 2175 2175 Oakland 2010 D2 City Council
3 23494 6 1 1 1 742 742 San Leandro 2010 D5 City Council
4 4862 22 1 4 1 364 364 Berkeley 2010 D7 City Council
4 5333 23 2 4 1 878 878 Berkeley 2010 D8 City Council
4 14040 24 2 4 1 2603 2603 Oakland 2010 D6 City Council
4 43661 19 1 3 1 2007 2007 Pierce 2008 City Council
4 159987 19 1 3 1 8396 8396 Pierce 2008 County Auditor
5 312771 49 4 9 1 2027 2027 Pierce 2008 County Executive
5 2544 65 1 12 1 89 89 Aspen 2009 Mayor
5 6426 85 1 17 1 1174 1174 Berkeley 2010 D1 City Council
5 5708 64 1 12 1 517 517 Berkeley 2010 D4 City Council
5 13482 49 1 9 1 486 486 Oakland 2012 D5 City Council
5 28703 65 2 13 1 2332 2332 San Leandro 2012 D4 City Council
7 23494 292 1 81 1 116 116 San Leandro 2010 Mayor
7 312771 312 19 98 9 1111 3650 Pierce 2008 County Assessor
7 26761 19 8 386 684 Oakland 2012 D3 City Council
8 23884 4989 2 3,905 2 2329 2329 Oakland 2010 D4 City Council
8 57492 7737 2 6,772 2 8522 8522 Berkeley 2012 Mayor
8 34180 1301 2 666 2 423 423 Oakland 2012 D1 City Council
11 122268 26195 4 90,988 18 1013 1013 Oakland 2010 Mayor
11 2544 15109 224 64,705 1,039 35 162 Aspen 2009 City Council
17 101431 — 234 timeout 5,067 10201 10201 Oakland 2014 Mayor
18 149465 — 94 timeout 1,300 50837 50837 San Francisco 2007 Mayor
36 79415 — 2 timeout 1,173 6949 6949 Minneapolis 2013 Mayor
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Table 4: Running times and margins computed for 29 IRV elections in the United States, using MRSW and margin+ (addition only).
|C| |B| MRSW LPs margin+ LPs MRSW margin+ Margin Last-Round Margin Race
Time (ms) Time (ms) LRMB+
2 45986 1 0 1 1 30711 30711 Berkeley 2010 Auditor
2 15243 1 0 1 1 9660 9660 Oakland 2010 D2 School Board
2 14040 1 0 1 1 9651 9651 Oakland 2010 D6 School Board
2 23494 1 0 1 1 16675 16675 San Leandro 2010 D3 City Council
3 122268 6 1 1 1 34162 34162 Oakland 2010 Auditor
3 15243 6 1 1 1 4349 4349 Oakland 2010 D2 City Council
3 23494 6 1 1 1 1484 1484 San Leandro 2010 D5 City Council
4 4862 22 1 2 1 728 728 Berkeley 2010 D7 City Council
4 5333 24 2 2 1 1756 1756 Berkeley 2010 D8 City Council
4 14040 24 2 2 1 5205 5205 Oakland 2010 D6 City Council
4 43661 19 1 2 1 4014 4014 Pierce 2008 City Council
4 159987 19 1 2 2 16792 16792 Pierce 2008 County Auditor
5 312771 49 4 4 1 4054 4054 Pierce 2008 County Executive
5 2544 65 1 6 1 177 177 Aspen 2009 Mayor
5 6426 79 1 7 1 2348 2348 Berkeley 2010 D1 City Council
5 5708 62 1 5 1 1033 1033 Berkeley 2010 D4 City Council
5 13482 49 1 4 1 972 972 Oakland 2012 D5 City Council
5 28703 62 2 6 1 4664 4664 San Leandro 2012 D4 City Council
7 23494 292 1 35 1 232 232 San Leandro 2010 Mayor
7 312771 312 19 53 7 2221 7299 Pierce 2008 County Assessor
8 23884 3801 2 1,714 2 4657 4657 Oakland 2010 D4 City Council
8 57492 5693 2 2,465 2 17044 17044 Berkeley 2012 Mayor
8 34180 1186 2 315 2 845 845 Oakland 2012 D1 City Council
11 122268 23541 4 45,285 21 2025 2025 Oakland 2010 Mayor
11 2544 13943 220 50,117 862 70 323 Aspen 2009 City Council
17 101431 — 224 timeout 4,812 20402 20402 Oakland 2014 Mayor
18 149465 — 94 timeout 1,273 101674 101674 San Francisco 2007 Mayor
36 79415 — 2 timeout 1,176 13898 13898 Minneapolis 2013 Mayor
1
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Table 5: Running times and margins computed for 29 IRV elections in the United States, using MRSW and margin− (deletion only).
|C| |B| MRSW LPs margin− LPs MRSW margin− Margin Last-Round Margin Race
Time (ms) Time (ms) LRMB−
2 45986 1 0 1 1 30711 30711 Berkeley 2010 Auditor
2 15243 1 0 1 1 9660 9660 Oakland 2010 D2 School Board
2 14040 1 0 1 1 9651 9651 Oakland 2010 D6 School Board
2 23494 1 0 1 1 16675 16675 San Leandro 2010 D3 City Council
3 122268 6 1 1 1 34162 34162 Oakland 2010 Auditor
3 15243 6 1 1 1 4349 4349 Oakland 2010 D2 City Council
3 23494 6 1 1 1 1484 1484 San Leandro 2010 D5 City Council
4 4862 22 1 2 1 728 728 Berkeley 2010 D7 City Council
4 5333 23 2 2 1 1756 1756 Berkeley 2010 D8 City Council
4 14040 24 2 2 1 5205 5205 Oakland 2010 D6 City Council
4 43661 19 1 2 1 4014 4014 Pierce 2008 City Council
4 159987 19 1 2 2 16792 16792 Pierce 2008 County Auditor
5 312771 49 4 5 3 4054 4054 Pierce 2008 County Executive
5 2544 65 1 7 1 177 177 Aspen 2009 Mayor
5 6426 84 1 8 1 2348 2348 Berkeley 2010 D1 City Council
5 5708 63 1 6 1 1033 1033 Berkeley 2010 D4 City Council
5 13482 49 1 4 1 972 972 Oakland 2012 D5 City Council
5 28703 65 2 7 1 4664 4664 San Leandro 2012 D4 City Council
7 23494 292 1 35 1 232 232 San Leandro 2010 Mayor
7 312771 312 19 54 11 2221 7299 Pierce 2008 County Assessor
8 23884 3667 2 1,094 2 4657 4657 Oakland 2010 D4 City Council
8 57492 6448 2 1,970 2 17044 17044 Berkeley 2012 Mayor
8 34180 1326 2 316 2 845 845 Oakland 2012 D1 City Council
11 122268 22091 4 16,715 18 2025 2025 Oakland 2010 Mayor
11 2544 14418 224 22,422 773 70 323 Aspen 2009 City Council
17 101431 — 310 timeout 5,488 18283 20402 Oakland 2014 Mayor
18 149465 — 193 timeout 1,621 100492 101674 San Francisco 2007 Mayor
36 79415 — 2 timeout 1,179 13898 13898 Minneapolis 2013 Mayor
1
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6.2 Deletion only
A common problem arising in elections is the inclusion of false ballots. In Australian state and federal
elections there is no mechanism to prevent duplicate voting by the same elector, except via an a posteriori
check that their name has not been crossed off at multiple polling places. In the case of multiple votes v by
the same elector (or multiple electors using the same identity) we can determine that the number of false
ballots (by that elector) is v − 1, but not which ballots are false.
Suppose some false ballots have been cast in an election. The question of whether these false extra ballots
could have changed the result of the election asks “what is the minimum number of ballots required to be
removed to change the result of the election.” The extension of our margin algorithm to answer this question
is also straightforward.
We modify the DistanceTo LP of Magrino et al. [2011] to calculate the minimum number of deleted
ballots required to enforce a certain elimination order, creating DistanceTo− (see Appendix A). We use
the modified lower bounding function lb+2 (in place of lb2), as adding ballots to a loser or deleting ballots
from the winner result in a manipulation of the same size.
We define margin− as a variation of margin+, in which all calls to DistanceTo+ are replaced by calls
to DistanceTo−. If an upper bound on the number of false ballots UF is known we can initialise U with
min{UF + 1, LRM
+
B }, as we are not interested in manipulations that require the deletion of more than UF
ballots. If margin− returns UF + 1, the election result cannot be changed by deleting UF or fewer ballots.
Table 5 reports, for each of the IRV elections we consider in this paper, the number of calls to the Dis-
tanceTo
− LP made by MRSW and margin−, the computation time (in milliseconds) of the two algorithms,
the margin of victory and the last-round margin (LRM−B = LRM
+
B ).
7 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
We have shown that IRV margins are feasible to compute in practice. Although it is possible that IRV
election instances will emerge that our algorithm cannot find margins for, we can efficiently compute the
electoral margin on all instances for which we could obtain data. This includes a number of instances for
which the current state-of-the-art approach could not compute the margin.
IRV has several natural extensions, including various forms of the Single Transferable Vote (STV). The
extension of our algorithm for computing margins in IRV elections to STV elections, where candidates are
elected to multiple seats, is a topic of future research. STV is used to elect candidates to the Australian
Senate, in all elections in Malta, and in most elections in the Republic of Ireland [Farrell and McAllister,
2005]. In the 2013 election of candidates to six seats in Western Australia’s Senate a discrepancy of 1,375
initially verified votes was discovered during a recount. The election result was overturned, and a repeat
election held in 2014. If the margin of victory for the original election was known, the question of whether the
loss of these ballots may have altered the resulting outcome could have been answered, potentially avoiding
a costly repeat election. Indeed, our algorithm for computing IRV margins can be applied to find a smallest
manipulation for the final IRV-only rounds of an STV count (for example, the election of a candidate to the
last seat, where no candidate has a quota). This size of this manipulation provides an upper bound on the
exact margin of victory.
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A Appendix A: MRSW Lower Bounding LP (DistanceTo)
Magrino et al. [2011] present a linear program (LP) to compute the smallest number of vote modifications
required (to the set of ballots cast in an IRV election between candidates C) to realise a (potentially partial)
elimination order pi ⊆ C. Given an elimination order pi, Magrino et al. [2011] define two rankings as equivalent
if, at the point at which each candidate in pi is eliminated, each ballot counts toward the tally of the same
candidate. For example, consider an elimination order [A, B, C]. The ranking [B,A,C] is equivalent to [B,C]
as they both count toward the tally of B in the first two rounds of counting (where A and B are eliminated),
and toward the tally of C in the third round [Magrino et al., 2011] . A ballot signature (ranking) S has an
associated equivalence class [[S]]pi , minimal with respect to set inclusion, such that S is equivalent to [[S]]pi
with respect to the elimination order pi = [c1, c2, ..., ck]. Let S = [c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n], then:
[[S]]pi = [c
′
i | i ∈ 1..n, ∃j ∈ 1..k.c
′
i = cj ∧ {c
′
1, . . . , c
′
i−1} ∩ {cj+1, . . . , ck} = ∅]
For simplicity of notation from now on we omit pi from [[S]]pi instead using [[S]].
Let S denote a set of equivalence classes which define (cover) the set of all possible rankings over C, n[[S]]
the number of ballots in the (original) election profile with a ranking equivalent to [[S]] ∈ S, and n the total
number of ballots in the election profile. Variables q[[S]], m[[S]], and y[[S]], respectively denote: the number of
ballots in the original profile that will be changed to have signature [[S]] ∈ S (i.e. their original ranking was
something other than [[S]]);3 the number of ballots in the original profile with signature [[S]] ∈ S that are
to be modified to something other than [[S]]; and the number of ballots in the new (modified) profile with
signature [[S]] ∈ S.
Magrino et al. [2011] define the lower bounding linear program DistanceTo as follows.
minimise
∑
[[S]]∈S
q[[S]] (10)
such that
n[[S]] + q[[S]] −m[[S]] = y[[S]] (11)
n ≥ y[[S]] ≥ 0 (12)
n[[S]] ≥ m[[S]] ≥ 0 (13)
q[[S]] ≥ 0 (14)∑
[[S]]∈S
q[[S]] =
∑
[[S]]∈S
m[[S]] (15)
∑
[[S]]∈Si,i
y[[S]] ≤
∑
[[S]]∈Sj,i
y[[S]] for all ci, cj ∈ pi such that i < j (16)
Constraint (11) ensures that the total number of ballots with signature [[S]] ∈ S in the new election profile
is equal to the sum of the number of ballots with this signature in the original profile and the number of
ballots whose signature is changed to [[S]], minus the number of ballots whose signature has been modified
from [[S]]. Constraint (15) ensures that the total number of ballots in the new election profile is equal to
that of the original (no ballots are added or removed). Constraint (16) defines a set of special elimination
constraints which force the candidates in pi to eliminated in the stated order (c1 followed by c2, leaving ck
as the last remaining candidate). The set Si,i denotes the set of signatures [[S]] ∈ S which will count toward
candidate ci in elimination round i (the round in which ci is eliminated). Similarly, Sj,i denotes the set of
signatures [[S]] ∈ S which will count toward cj in the ith round (in which ci is eliminated).
3Magrino et al. [2011] use p[[S]] to denote the number of ballots in the original profile modified to have signature [[S]] ∈ S.
We use notation q[[S]] to avoid confusion with the projection of a sequence pi onto a set S
′, of pS′ (pi).
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A.1 Addition only
It is easy to modify the LP of Magrino et al. [2011] to consider the case in which the only manipulation that
can take place is that new ballots can be added. Let us reinterpret variable q[[S]] as the number of ballots
with signature [[S]] ∈ S added to the original profile. We set m[[S]] = 0 for [[S]] ∈ S, and remove Constraint
(15) which forces the number of ballots in the modified profile to equal that of the original. We denote the
resulting lower bounding LP as DistanceTo+.
A.2 Deletion only
We can similarly modify the LP of Magrino et al. [2011] to consider the case in which the only manipulation
that can take place is the deletion of existing ballots. Let us reinterpret variable m[[S]] as the number of
ballots with signature [[S]] ∈ S in the original election profile that we will delete. We set q[[S]] = 0 for [[S]] ∈ S,
and again remove Constraint (15) which forces the number of ballots in the modified election profile to equal
that of the original. In this setting, we need only consider equivalence classes [[S]] for ballot signatures S that
actually occur in the election S ∈ B, as we can only remove ballots that already exist. Finally, we replace the
objective of the LP with
∑
[[S]]∈S,S∈Bm[[S]]. We denote the resulting lower bounding LP as DistanceTo
−.
B Appendix B: Additional Results
We show in Table 6 the difference in the performance of our branch-and-bound algorithm when using the
looser pruning rule lb1, defined in Equation 6, relative to the tighter pruning rule lb2, defined in Equation 9.
These results demonstrate that fewer LPs are solved when using lb2, but that this does not necessarily lead
to faster margin computation. The lb2 score is more costly to compute than lb1. In the 2007 San Francisco
Mayor election, for example, 1300 ms are used to compute the margin when pruning with lb2 (solving 94
LPs). In contrast, 1139 ms are used when pruning with lb1, even though 970 LPs are solved in the process.
In the majority of instances considered, however, pruning with lb2 was either faster, or as fast, as pruning
with lb1.
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Table 6: Running times and margins computed for 29 IRV elections in the United States, using margin with the lb1 and lb2 pruning rules.
|C| |B| margin(lb1) LPs margin(lb2) LPs margin(lb1) margin(lb2) Margin Last-Round Margin Race
Time (ms) Time (ms) LRMB
2 45986 0 0 1 1 15356 15356 Berkeley 2010 Auditor
2 15243 0 0 1 1 4830 4830 Oakland 2010 D2 School Board
2 14040 0 0 1 1 4826 4826 Oakland 2010 D6 School Board
2 23494 0 0 1 1 8338 8338 San Leandro 2010 D3 City Council
3 122268 1 1 1 1 17081 17081 Oakland 2010 Auditor
3 15243 1 1 1 1 2175 2175 Oakland 2010 D2 City Council
3 23494 1 1 1 1 742 742 San Leandro 2010 D5 City Council
4 4862 6 1 2 1 364 364 Berkeley 2010 D7 City Council
4 5333 2 2 1 1 878 878 Berkeley 2010 D8 City Council
4 14040 6 2 2 1 2603 2603 Oakland 2010 D6 City Council
4 43661 1 1 1 1 2007 2007 Pierce 2008 City Council
4 159987 1 1 2 1 8396 8396 Pierce 2008 County Auditor
5 312771 16 4 9 1 2027 2027 Pierce 2008 County Executive
5 2544 7 1 3 1 89 89 Aspen 2009 Mayor
5 6426 1 1 1 1 1174 1174 Berkeley 2010 D1 City Council
5 5708 1 1 1 1 517 517 Berkeley 2010 D4 City Council
5 13482 1 1 1 1 972 972 Oakland 2012 D5 City Council
5 28703 6 2 3 1 4664 4664 San Leandro 2012 D4 City Council
7 23494 1 1 1 1 116 116 San Leandro 2010 Mayor
7 312771 60 19 17 9 1111 3650 Pierce 2008 County Assessor
8 23884 5 2 2 2 2329 2329 Oakland 2010 D4 City Council
8 57492 6 2 2 2 17044 17044 Berkeley 2012 Mayor
8 34180 5 2 2 2 845 845 Oakland 2012 D1 City Council
11 122268 10 4 11 18 1013 1013 Oakland 2010 Mayor
11 2544 642 224 1,241 1,039 35 162 Aspen 2009 City Council
17 101431 596 234 1,028 5,067 10201 10201 Oakland 2014 Mayor
18 149465 970 94 1,139 1,300 50837 50837 San Francisco 2007 Mayor
36 79415 6 2 151 1,173 6949 6949 Minneapolis 2013 Mayor
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